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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

;
)

CASE NO. 20010443-CA

DAVID ANTHONY RICKS,
)

PRIORITY NO. 2

Defendant/Appellee.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (i) (1999) .
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
See Addendum A for text of pertinent statutes, rules,
and constitutional provisions.
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF
ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO.1: Did the trial court err by denying Ricks' Motion
for Directed Verdict.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A jury verdict

is upheld unless

the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable
as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element.
2

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
PRESERVATION:

This

issue

was

raised

in

a motion

before the trial court.
ISSUE NO. 2: Was Ricks denied effective assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In challenging a conviction on
the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is
defendant's burden to show (1) that his counsel rendered
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and
(2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have
been different but for counsel's error. State v. Geary,
707

P.2d

645

(Utah

1985);

see

also

Strickland

v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984). This issue is properly raised for the first
time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah
App.1991) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
David Anthony Ricks was charged by Information with
one count of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-103 and one count
of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by Restricted Person,
3

a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-503(1)(a)

on

September

12,

2000,

amended

to

Possession of Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a
Second Degree Felony, on October 31, 2000.

On February

27 and 28, 2001, Ricks was tried by a jury, and found
guilty as charged.

On May 11, 2001, a Judgment and

Commitment to State Prison was entered, and Ricks was
sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed fifteen
years in the State Prison.

On May 18, 2001, Ricks filed

a Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Charene Martinez testified that during her employment
at 7-Eleven, the appellant David Ricks used to visit the
store as a customer
149, 15:1-6.

up to six or seven times a day.

Charene testified that she never dated Mr.

Ricks, nor gave him her address or telephone number.
149, 15:7-18.
consider
customer.

R.

R.

She also testified that she did not even

him a friend, but merely

considered

him a

R. 149, 15:25, 16:1-5.

In August

of 2000, Charene Martinez lived

in a

ground-floor apartment of an apartment complex located in
4

West Jordan, Utah.

R. 149, 16:14-25, 17:1-6.

She had

lived at that location for about six months in August of
2000, and Mr. Ricks had never visited her there prior to
August

15, 2000.

R.

149,

17:15-23. On

that

Charene had a "get-together'' at her apartment.

night,
R. 14 9,

19:7-20.
"Charene testified that at approximately
night,

she

received

a

phone

call

from

9:00
a

man

that
who

identified himself as "Josh" and asked for her address.
R. 149, 19:16-25, 20:5-11, 51:6-9.

She testified that

she had a friend named Josh and believed the caller was
that friend, and therefore gave the caller her address.
R. 149, 20:1-15.

However, she testified that spoke to

her friend Josh afterwards, and he said that he never
called that night.

R. 149, 20:18-22.

Charene testified that in the early morning hours of
August 16, 2000, she was cleaning up after the party with
her friend Wes Burella when she heard a knock at the
window.

R. 149, 20:22-25, 21:1-4.

She testified that

she looked out the window and didn't see anyone, and
looked out the peephole, but it was "covered with
5

[a]

hand or something."

R. 149, 21:15-25.

She testified

that she nevertheless opened the door "all the way/'
thinking it might be a friend from the party who forgot
something.

R. 149,

22:3-23, 23:2-6.

She testified that

once she opened the door, she saw David Ricks standing
there and that "he kind of just walked in." R. 149, 23:710.

She testified that she did not invite him in or say

anything.

R. 149, 23:11-12.

She testified that she did

not tell him to leave right away because she was "afraid
of him." . 19-24. But she also testified that there had
been no prior animosity between them,

R. 149, 49:20-25,

and that he was fairly pleasant and he was not acting
angry or threatening when he arrived. R. 149, 53:17-25.
Charene testified that Mr. Ricks did not say anything
to her, but simply walked in and sat down in a chair next
to

her

front

door.

R.

149,

24:1-3,

24:16-17. She

testified that after Mr. Ricks sat down, she went and sat
by her friend Wes on the sofa.

R. 149, 24:18-21.

She

testified that Mr. Ricks seemed happy when he first
arrived, but that his faced changed and that he seemed
upset after he saw Wes. R. 149, 43;17-23.
6

She testified

that the couch on which she and Wes were sitting was
touching the chair on which Mr. Ricks was sitting.
149, 26:1-8.

She testified that they were sitting on the

couch so that Wes was closer to Mr. Ricks.
2.

R.

R. 149, 26:1-

She testified that for several minutes, nothing was

said by either her, Wes, or Mr. Ricks. R. 149, 26:10-25.
During that time, she did not ask Mr. Ricks to leave.

R.

149, 26:17-19.
Charene

testified

that

she

decided

to

call

the

police, and got up and headed for the phone. R. 14 9:27:12. She testified that the phone rang as she went toward
it, and she answered it.

Ft. 149, 27:17-18. She testified

that she talked to the caller "Pat" about a party at
Pat's house.

R. 149, 27:19-25.

However, when reminded

that she had testified at the preliminary hearing that
"Chad" was the caller that night, she denied that she had
previously said it was "Chad," and testified that she had
said at the preliminary hearing that "Chad and Pat" were
on the phone.

R. 149, 55:15-25, 56:1-5.

However, she

then testified at trial that it was not "Chad and Pat,"
but just Pat who called that night.
7

R. 56:3-8.

When

asked

whether

she

meant

answered, "Or somebody."

that
R.

it

was

149:12-13.

just

Pat,

she

Chad Studham

testified that it was Pat who called Charene, and that he
was present when the call was made.

R. 149, 81:17-25,

82:1-11
At trial, Charene said that she did not know how Mr.
Ricks and her brother-in-law, Chad Studham, knew each
other, and further, she denied that she knew that the two
men had been in prison together.

R. 149, 48:20-25, 49:1-

13. However, at the preliminary hearing, she testified
that Mr. Chadham knew Mr. Ricks because they were in
prison together.

R. 149, 57:3-5.

Mr. Chadham testified

that he knew Mr. Ricks from prison.

R. 149, 81:17-24.

Charene testified that while she was talking to Pat
on the phone, Mr. Ricks and her friend Wes were having a
conversation.

R. 149, 28:21-25. She testified that she

"tried to change

[her] voice up and down" so that the

caller would know something was wrong,
but did not

specifically

R. 149, 28:6-8,

say that anything was wrong

because she did not feel comfortable saying anything in
front of Mr. Ricks.

R. 149, 28:16-20. However, she also
8

testified that she went outside with the phone to smoke
a cigarette, and still did not mention to the caller that
anything was wrong because she "was just hoping that he
would know something was wrong."
6.

R. 149, 29:1-10, 30:1-

On cross-examination, she testified that she didn't

tell the caller anything was wrong while she was outside
because she was afraid Mr. Ricks would overhear. R. 149,
58:2-10.

While outside with the phone, she did not call

the police.
Charene testified that, after terminating her phone
conversation with Pat, she went back inside the apartment
and sat on the couch next to Wes.

R. 149, 1-10. She

testified that as she went over to the sofa, she heard
Mr. Ricks telling Wes that she was a slut and that Wes
would "never get a chance with [her]."

R. 149, 30:11-14.

She testified that as she was sitting on the sofa, Mr.
Ricks asked her what she was doing, and that she replied
that she was going to go to sleep.

R. 149, 31:9-14.

She

testified that Mr. Ricks Mgot up like he was leaving,"
R.

149,

31:15-17,

but

instead

approached

Wes

and

"grabbed Wes' right hand with his left hand, like he was
9

shaking his hand "bye" and then "with his right hand, hit
[Charene]

in

the

face."

R.

149,

31:18-12,

32:1-6.

Charene first testified without hesitation that Mr. Ricks
hit her on the left side of the face with his right hand.
R. 149, 32:11-15, but when asked again, she answered that
she could not recall which side of the face he hit her
on.

R. 149, 32:16-17.

She testified at trial that as he

hit her, Mr. Ricks said, "This is the last time you fuck
with me bitch." R. 149, 32:24-25.
the

incident

mention

to

that

the police

Mr.

statement. R. 149,

Ricks

However, in describing

that

had

night,

made

she

this

did

not

particular

59:14-25, 60:1-5.

Charene testified that she got up from the sofa after
Mr.

Ricks

apartment.

hit

her,

and

told

R. 149, 33:3-9.

him

to

get

out

of

her

She testified that Mr. Ricks

walked backwards the three or four feet to the door, R.
149,

33:11-12, 20-25,

34:1-5. She testified

that

she

"walked towards him," R. 14 9, 33:4, and that she "was
mad" and asked him "why he kept following [her] and why
he was there."

R. 149, 17-19.

She testified that Mr.

Ricks was calling her names, like "bitch" and "slut" and
10

"cunt," and that she was screaming back to Mr. Ricks. R.
149, 61:24-25.

She testified that when Mr. Ricks reached

the door, he reached back and opened it.

R. 149, 34:13-

15.

She testified that during all of this, her friend

Wes

remained

anything.

sitting

on

the

couch

and

did

not

do

R. 149, 34:16-19.

Charene testified that as she was approaching Mr.
Ricks, her head suddenly hit the barrel of a gun.

R.

149, 35:9-10.

R.

14 9, 35:10.

She said she "walked right into it."

She testified that she couldn't remember

whether she told the police that she physically "walked
into the barrel of the gun." R. 149, 62:20-25, 63:1-2.
She testified that she did not see Mr. Ricks pull the
gun, but merely saw him "moving his shirt" as she moved
toward him.

R. 149, 35:13-25.

Mr. Ricks had on shorts

and a t-shirt that night. R. 149, 62:14-16., 84:9-10. She
described the gun as "a little one," that was "black" or
"grey kind of," and "a normal gun" of the type "you had
to pull back on."

R. 149, 36:2-6.

She testified that her friend Wes Barella finally got
up and walked up behind her, and told Mr. Ricks to "drop
11

the gun and to leave."

R. 149, 36:15-18. She testified

that Wes Barella was smaller physically then her. R. 149,
63:11-22. She testified that Mr. Ricks then pulled the
gun away, and "cocked the thing back," and then pushed
the gun against the side of her head. R. 149, 37:4-23.
She testified that while he held the gun to her head, he
continued calling her names and yelling at her.
37:25, 38:1-5.

R. 149,

She testified that Mr. Ricks said that

"[she] should die'7 among other things, but testified that
she couldn't remember everything he said.
11.

She

also

testified

that

she

R. 149, 38:6-

couldn't

remember

whether she had told the police about the "should die"
statement.

R. 149, 63:23-25, 64:1-5.

She testified that after "awhile," Mr. Ricks began
moving backwards out the door.

R. 149, 38:24-25, 39:1-6.

She testified that she pushed Mr. Ricks out the door, and
shut and locked the door. R. 149, 39:6-7. When crossexamined about whether she truly pushed Mr. Ricks out the
door, she answered, "I guess,"

R. 149, 65:16-23, and

finally stated, "I don't really remember what happened."
R. 149, 65:20-24.

She testified that after closing the
12

door, she went to the ground and pulled Wes with her.
149:10-18.

She testified that

R.

she had her phone in her

hand throughout the incident, and just pushed redial from
where she was on the floor.

R. 149,

39:11-22.

She

testified that her sister answered the phone, R. 149,
39:22-25, and although she didn't remember what she said
to her
telling

sister, she remembered
her

to

call

911."

crying, and her
R.

149,

40:8-11.

sister
She

testified that she initially pressed "redial," instead of
calling 911, because she was scared and "didn't think to
dial 911."

R. 149, 40:15-17.

She testified that during the time she was talking to
her sister, she could hear Mr. Ricks pounding on the door
with the gun, and tapping on the window with some object.
R. 149, 41:3-13. She testified that she heard Mr. Ricks
yelling from outside, calling her names and threatening
her. R. 149, 76:1-6.

She testified that the pounding and

tapping stopped right when she hung up from the call to
her sister.

R. 149, 41:14-18.

She testified that she

couldn't remember whether she told the police about Mr.
13

Ricks pounding
outside.

on the door and yelling

after he was

R. 149, 66:11-25.

After talking to her sister, Charene did call the 911
operator.

R.

149,

40:18-25. She

testified

that

Chad

Studham, her brother-in-law, arrived at her apartment
while she was on the phone with the 911 operator.

R.

149,

he

41:19-23.

Mr.

Studham

testified

that

as

approached Charene's apartment, he saw Mr. Ricks "walking
out of the side of the building that Charene lived in."
R. 149, 83:22-25.

Mr. Studham testified that Mr. Ricks

walked casually away from the building, and get into a
dark-colored truck and drive away.

R. 149, 85:1-12.

Mr.

Studham testified that he shined "spotlight lamp" that he
was carrying directly at Mr. Ricks, but that Mr. Ricks
did not respond in any way.

T. 149, 84:18-25, 91:1-10.

He further testified that he went to Charene's apartment
after Mr. Ricks left, and that Charene would not open the
door

immediately,

identified himself.

and

did

so only

after Mr.

R. 149, 87:1-8.

Studham

He testified that

Charene was very emotional and had a red mark on her
face.

R.

149, 87:9-13.

The police
14

arrived

shortly

thereafter.

T. 149, 44:10-12.

West Jordan Police Officer Mark Slade testified that
the 911 call was received at 1:32 a.m., and that he
arrived at Charene's apartment shortly after that.
149, 95:1-25.
Charene

R.

Officer Slade testified that he asked

just enough questions about the incident to

determine what had happened and whether a crime had been
committed.

R. 149, 96:13-25, 97:1-7.

He testified that

Charene was emotional, and was crying and then angry when
he was interviewing her.

R. 149, 97:17-23. He testified

that Charene told him Mr. Ricks had slapped her in the
face, R. 149, 98:2-5, and then "pulled the gun from his
waistband area, and racked a round in a loading motion."
R. 149, 99:1-4. He testified that he examined Charene's
face, and did not detect any redness or swelling. R. 149,
98:6-12.
Ten or twenty minutes after the police arrived, Mr.
Ricks called Charene's apartment.
45:1.

R. 149, 44:18-25,

Charene answered the phone, and when she realized

that it was Mr. Ricks, she handed the phone to one of the
police officers that was there.
15

R. 149, 45:19-25.

She

testified,
talk.

He

"When I talk to
just

starts

[David] , he never lets me

going."

R.

45:22-23.

She

testified that she got on another phone to continue the
conversation with Mr. Ricks.

R. 45:23-25. She testified

that she asked Mr. Ricks why he hit her, and that he
answered
"You're

"because

. . ." and then changed, and said,

a lying bitch."

R.

149, 45:3-7.

She

also

testified that he said "[she] deserved to get smacked
and [she] ain't better than anybody."

R. 149,

45:11-13.

Officer Slade testified that while he was listening
on the phone, he heard Charene ask, "Why did you tell me
your name was Josh?" and heard the other person say, "I
didn't.

I said my name was David." R. 149, 101:11-14.

He testified that he also heard Charene ask, "Why did you
hit [me]?" and the other person, a male, answered, "Well,
because

. . .," and then after a pause, the male said

"something to the effect of he is not stupid."
102:4-7.

R. 149,

He testified that he heard Charene ask the male

again, "Why did you hit me and pull a gun on me?", and
that the male answered, "I don't know what you're talking
about." R. 149, 102:16-22.
16

Officer Slade testified that he retrieved the phone
number of the male caller, and was informed by dispatch
that the number belonged to David Ricks. R. 149, 103:1625, 104:1-2.

Charene Martinez testified that Mr. Ricks

called her apartment twice while the police were there,
and a couple of times after the police left.

R. 149,

46:16-18.
Officer Slade testified once the officers made sure
the immediate threat was gone, the other two officers
left Charene's apartment, and Mr. Slade stayed and spoke
to Charene. R. 149, 107:13-17. He testified that Charene
Martinez never mentioned to him, on the night of the
incident, that Mr. Ricks had verbally threatened her.
149,

109:16-21.

representations,

And

in

Officer

fact,

based

Slade wrote

on

Charene's

in his report,

"Ricks did not make any threats to Martinez."
109:25, 110:1-4.

R.

R. 149,

Slade also testified that Charene never

mentioned to him that the gun physically touched her in
any way, or that she "bumped into the gun." R. 14 9,
110:6-19.
Officer Slade testified that Charene did not tell him
17

that Mr. Ricks had come into her apartment and sat down
calmly for some time.
testified

that

she

R. 149, 111:23-25.

told

him

that

Mr.

In fact, he

Ricks

started

yelling right when he walked into the apartment.

R. 14 9,

11:19-22. Charene also did not mention that the apartment
door was open when Mr. Ricks was allegedly holding a gun
to her head in the doorway, and that people walked by
outside during the incident.
Charene

testified

that

R. 149, 111:10-18.
she

talked

to

several

different police officers on the night of the incident,
and that she told different bits and pieces of the story
to different officers.

R. 149, 73:1-5. She testified

that she did not feel that she had a chance to tell her
whole story that night.

R. 149, 73:16-18.

Finally, Kevin Judd, a police officer with the Salt
Lake County Attorney's office, testified that he made an
attempt to locate Wes Burella, for the purpose of having
him testify at trial, but was unable to locate him.
149, 142:1-8.

R.

Officer Judd also testified that he has

some expert knowledge of handguns and demonstrated the
action required to prepare a semi-automatic pistol for
18

firing.

R. 149, 143:11-25, 144:1-15.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court erred when it denied Ricksf motion
for directed verdict
insufficient

on both counts, where there was

evidence

that Ricks possessed

firearm. Additionally,

Ricks was denied

his

or used a
right

to

effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed
to request severance of the two counts, thereby causing
the

admission

criminal
charge

of

prejudicial

conviction,
of

possession

which
of

evidence

was
a

relevant

dangerous

of

his

only

prior
to

weapon

by

the
a

restricted person, to be considered by the jury on the
aggravated assault charge.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Appellant's
Motion for Directed Verdict.

Motions for directed verdicts in criminal proceedings
are governed by U.C.A., 1953, § 77-17-3 and Rule 17(o) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, § 7735-17 (o)) .

Section

77-17-3

requires

the

immediate

discharge of a defendant "[w]hen it appears to the court
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that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant
to

his

defense."

Rule

17 (o)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal Procedure authorizes the dismissal of an entire
information or indictment, or any count thereof, either
at the end of State's evidence or at the close of all the
evidence
legally

" upon the ground
sufficient

to

that the evidence

establish

the

offense

is not
charged

therein or any lesser included offense."
The standard for determining whether an order denying
a motion for directed verdict is erroneous is the same as
that applied by an appellate court in determining whether
a

jury

verdict

should be

set aside

for

insufficient

evidence. Under that standard, a jury verdict is upheld
unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to

the verdict,

is so inconclusive

or

so

inherently

improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that
element. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983);
State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982); State
v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).
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When

the

evidence

presented

is

conflicting

or

disputed, the jury generally serves as the exclusive
judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be given particular evidence.
Myers,

606

P. 2d 250, 253

See e.g. State v.

(Utah

1980).

However, a

reviewing court may evaluate whether the evidence is so
inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Petree, 659 P.2d at 445; see also State v. Webb, 779 P.2d
1108, 1114 (Utah 1989) (opinion of Stewart, J., stating
the position of the Court).
In

the

instant

case,

Ricks

was

convicted

of

Aggravated Assault and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon
by a Restricted Person, with of which "possession of
firearm or dangerous weapon" is an element.
Utah Code Ann.

§

7 6-5-103

(governing

aggravated

assault) provides:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102
and he:
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(a) intentionally causes
injury to another; or

serious

bodily

(b) under circumstances not amounting to a
violation of Subsection (1) (a), uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 7 6-1601 or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a)(governing possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person) provides
that: A [person previously convicted of a violent felony]
who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under
his custody or control . . .

any firearm is guilty of a

second degree felony."
The only evidence presented at trial regarding the
possession or use of a weapon by Ricks was the testimony
of Charene Martinez, which, as discussed below, was so
contradictory as to be "inherently improbable."
For instance, Charene testified at trial that she
"walked into" the barrel of the gun.

R. 149, 62:20-25.

And yet Officer Slade, the officer who spoke to Charene
that night, testified that she never mentioned "walking
into" the gun, or having had any physical contact with
22

the

gun

at

testified

all.

R.

149,

110:6-19.

Charene

also

at trial that she "pushed" Ricks out of her

door as he stood there with the gun pointed at her head,
R. 149, 39:6-7, and then upon being questioned further,
she stated that she did not actually remember whether she
pushed him or not.

R. 149, 65:20-24.

She also testified

that some people walked outside by as she and Ricks stood
in the open doorway of her apartment, with Ricks holding
a

gun

to

her

head.

R.

149,

65:1-11.

Yet, this

was

another "fact" that she did not mention to Officer Slade.
R. 149, 65:12-15.
Clearly, Charene's testimony regarding this incident
in effect, that Charene was charging toward David Ricks
as he backed up to the door, when suddenly she ran facefirst

into

the barrel

of a gun, and

that

some

people

walked by outside while she stood there in the doorway
with a gun pointed to her head, and that she then pushed
David

Ricks

out the door and

locked

the door —

is

so

highly improbable that her testimony alone cannot support
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

23

Her testimony is rendered all the more inconclusive
by the many contradictions in her testimony. For example,
she testified at trial that Ricks threatened to kill her,
and yet, did not mention that fact to Officer Slade
either.

R. 149, 109:25, 110:1-4.

Moreover, Charene testified that she was frightened
of Ricks from the moment he arrived at her apartment, and
yet she did not ask him to leave, or inform him at all
that he was not welcome.

Additionally, she testified

that either Pat or Chad called her while Ricks was
sitting on the chair, and that she could not tell the
caller that she was frightened and needed help because
Ricks was sitting nearby and would overhear, R. 149,
29:1-10, and yet, she went outside her apartment with the
telephone and still did not inform the caller of her
alleged fears, and did not call the police, which she
asserted was her intent in picking up the phone in the
first place.

R. 149, 149, 27:1-2. Moreover, she went

back into her apartment and sat on the sofa near Ricks
after

picking up the phone for the purported purpose of

calling the police because she was afraid of Ricks, and
24

not doing so.
She

R. 149, 30:1-10.

also testified that Ricks sat calmly in her

apartment before any kind of disturbance occurred, and
yet, she told Officer Slade that Ricks began yelling from
the moment he walked into her apartment.

R. 14 9, 11:19-

22.
Finally,

with

regards

to the phone

conversations

overheard by Officer Slade, it was only in response to
the question "Why did you hit me?" that Ricks was alleged
to have answered, Well, because . . . ."

R. 149, 102:4-

7. R., 149, 45:23-25. Thus, that evidence did not support
the allegation that Ricks used a gun, but simply that he
may have struck Charene.
In sum, the testimony of Charene Martinez was so
improbable, that it does not constitute proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ricks possessed or used a dangerous
weapon.
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II.

Ricks was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel

Generally,
assistance
two-part

to

of

successfully

counsel,

test

a

established

claim

defendant
by

the

ineffective

must

satisfy

a

Supreme

Court

in

Strickland and recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). Under this
test,

a

defendant

must

show

performance was deficient and

(1)

that

counsel's

(2) that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Lairby, 699 P.2d at
1203-04.
To

show

defendant
omissions

counsel's

must
that

performance

identify
"fall

counsel's
outside

was

deficient, a

specific

the

wide

acts

or

range

of

professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); see also Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
defendant

must

show

that

To show prejudice, a

"counsel's

errors

were

so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064. Under this prong of the test, the defendant must
26

show

that

a "reasonable probability"

trial result would have been

exists

that

the

different if counsel had

not erred. Id^ at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Frame, 723
P.2d at 405. "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.

Ct. at

2068; Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205-06.
Ricks' trial counsel rendered his

representation

constitutionally deficient by failing to request that the
two

counts

be

severed

so

that

the

evidence

on

the

aggravated felony charge would be heard separately from
the evidence on the "felon in possession" charge.

1

Under

Generally, an appellant cannot raise an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for the first time on appeal
because the trial record is insufficient to allow the claim
to be determined. See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027,
1029 (Utah 1991). An appellant, however, can raise such a
claim if the trial record is adequate to permit
determination of the issue and there is new counsel on
appeal. I_d^_; State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah
App.1991). In the instant case, Coonce believed the record
was inadequate to properly permit determination of many
aspects of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and
filed a motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
23B requesting that the case be remanded for the trial court
to enter findings of fact relevant to his claim. His motion
was denied by this Court, and Coonce therefore argues his
claim based on the existing record.
27

Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "two or
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or
information in a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged arise out of a criminal episode . . . ."
In the instant case, all of the charges against defendant
arose from the same criminal episode. Thus, joinder of
the charges was admittedly proper in the first instance.
Utah R.Crim.P. Rule 9 further provides, however:
If it appears that a defendant or the
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or defendants in an indictment or
information, or by a joinder for trial together,
the court shall order an election of separate
trials of separate counts, or grant a severance
of defendants, or provide such other relief as
justice requires.
In the instant case, but for the joinder, evidence
that Ricks was a convicted felon and had previously been
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison would not have been
inadmissible at trial on the aggravated assault charge
under Utah R. Evid. Rule

404 which provides

"other

crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith."
28

Evidence
clearly

that defendant was

relevant

to

prove

a

a convicted

fact

other

felon

than

was

criminal

disposition material to the offense of possession of a
firearm by a restricted person; however, this

evidence

was not relevant to the aggravated assault charge, except
to

show

a

criminal

disposition

inference that he was guilty.

as

the

basis

for

an

Thus, at a separate trial

on the aggravated assault charges, this evidence

would

have been inadmissible under Rule 404.
The

admission

prejudicial

to

of

Ricks'

this

evidence

defense

aggravated assault case.

with

was

regards

clearly
to

the

As the Utah Supreme Court

noted in State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, (1985):
The
basis
of
these
limitations
on
the
admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused
because of bad character rather than because he
is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged.
Because of this tendency, such evidence is
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for
the admission of the evidence other than to show
criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded.
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In

Saunders,

the

Supreme

Court

reversed

the

defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary, and held
that

fail

to

sever,

resulting

in

the

admission

of

evidence regarding the defendant's past criminal conduct
was prejudicial.
Clearly, the failure of Ricks' counsel to move
severance,

resulting

in

the

prejudicial character evidence,

admission

of

for

highly

!!

fall[s] outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance.11 State v.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
to

Saunders,

this

error

was

Moreover, pursuant

clearly

prejudicial.

Accordingly, Ricks was denied his right under the Sixth
Amendment to competent counsel, and his conviction should
be vacated on that basis.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ricks respectfully requests
that his conviction be vacated and remanded to the trial
court for entry of a verdict of not guilty.
DATED this

<£/

day/of £^cem^er>^ 2002.
[Zi

SHXRON PRESTON
Attorney for David Ricks
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ADDENDUM
A

Utah Code Section 76-5-103

Page 1 of 1

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and
he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon
as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
Amended by Chapter 291, 1995 General Session
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76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of dangerous
weapons by certain persons.
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A Category 1 restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5;
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101; or
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an
adult would have been a violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5.
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony;
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by
an adult would have been a felony;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and intentionally in unlawful
possession of a Schedule I controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense;
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony offense;
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental
institution;
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the United States.
(2) A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody
or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody
or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same time.
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in another section for one who
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the
penalties of that section control.
Repealed and Re-enacted by Chapter 303, 2000 General Session
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